Dr Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, London , UK

As we head towards the 15 th anniversary of Somaliland's reassertion of its independence, our international political achievement record makes a grim reading – Somaliland has neither received a political recognition from a single country, nor has it secured a reliable friend that it can turn to when push comes to shove. So, what went wrong with Somaliland 's search for international relations and recognition? Has the world let us down or did we make some miscalculations?

Let us first deal with the broader context. In the struggle for political recognition, our politicians often justify the country's reassertion from the voluntary unity with Somalia mainly by referring to the bitter experience people of Somaliland suffered at the hands of southerners during that unity. They point out the way the people were treated as second-class citizens with all major political positions and development funds going to the south. Also emphasized is the mass massacre subjected to the people of Somaliland and the bombardment of their towns and cities that followed. The perception is that Somaliland is a response to cruel behaviour by the south partner of the former Republic of Somalia . They view an independent state of Somaliland as being a mechanism for preventing a repeat of such cruelty and a peace of mind for the people of Somaliland .

This approach shows two weaknesses however. The first is the claim by Somaliland politicians that they will win the international community's approval if only they can get the world understand the difficulties the people of Somaliland had suffered at the hands of the former Somali regime. After pursuing this policy for 14 years, however, the issue of recognition of Somaliland is as remote as ever.

The present strategy denies that Somaliland is a nation that consists of different communities who actually hold different views on the country's present and past history. And in fact some of them may even feel as being particularly misrepresented in the rationale for the state reassertion. The road to recognition will continue to prove difficult, until our leaders grasp the need for identifying more unifying arguments for our recognition, taking into full account of what binds us together today rather than what divided us yesterday.

The second weakness is the insistence that the creation of Somaliland will somehow prevent from further conflicts and abuse of power. Yet in Somaliland we have experienced an armed civil conflict and political discomfort. The creation of state of Somaliland must not be seen as a panacea for conflicts inherently associated with clan-oriented societies like ours.

For this matter, a finger of blame is pointed towards the current Somaliland administration as well as the previous ones. In Tour's government, the issue of Somaliland 's recognition was not given a serious thought at all. The country was faced with other priorities. But in the Egal era, the strategy towards recognition took some shape. His foreign policy, however, lacked initiatives and was mainly reactionary. It can be captured in one of his famous phrases ‘the world has turned its back towards us'.

Unlike his predecessors, Riyaale administration is reaching out the world but his message lacks substance and vision. First, there is a problem of conceptualization. The way the case for Somaliland is often set out seems to be emotional and undiplomatic. The arguments underpinning the case paint a picture of a victimized people whose healing process demands an international support in a form of political recognition. At the root of this conceptualization lies past experience as a rationale for the recognition and little is offered in the way of forward thinking. We need to emphasize on what we as the new nation of Somaliland can offer to the region and the world and what we have so far achieved. We should also be linking this concept into the international and regional agenda. For example, Somaliland can be presented to the world as a potential partner in the spread of democracy, war on terrorism, and in mechanisms for peace and conflict resolution in the region and the world. Yes, this should include the role that a recognized state of Somaliland can play in making peace in Somalia and the region. This holistic approach could win Somaliland more friends than solely focusing on victim-focused approach.

There is also a problem of policy co-ordination. Edna Ismail, the Foreign Minister, has the responsibility for maintaining our foreign contacts while Awil, the Finance Minister, apparently, has a role in that too. We often see conflicts arising from this arrangement which results in substance of our foreign policy being lost in the race of out-performing each other's contribution. The president can assign a member of his government for special tasks, but we need him to draw clearer lines of responsibilities and let the public know where the accountability lies.

We also need to take note of experiences elsewhere. Southern Sudan is a case in point. When SPLA lost the support of Mengistu Haile Mariam, John Garang looked west and switched his policy, stressing the faith card and war against terrorism. He skillfully harnessed American might behind his movement. Learning from this experience, Somaliland can abandon its allegiance with the Arab world and adjust its flag accordingly to demonstrate that shift. We should understand that the American power is unavoidable fact and that the trick is how to mobilize it in our favour. We can do this by becoming a strategic partner of the American war against international terrorism by offering a base in Berbera.

Moreover, the expectation from some of our so-called friends is substantially inflated. In fact the idea that Somaliland has countries it could call allies is less convincing. Take Ethiopia as an example. If Somaliland were a true friend or an alley of Ethiopian government, surely Abdullah Yusuf would not have contemplated to invade Sool and East Sanaag , let alone annexing them. Instead, Ethiopia prefers to support Abdillaahi Yusuf in his plan of taking control of Somalia . Although I appreciate the South Africa 's efforts to campaign for Somaliland within the AU, we are yet to see tangible progress from that relationship either.

But the suggestion here is not that Riyaale should pack up and go home, but that the poor performance of his foreign policy needs to be recognized and addressed. This means that a comprehensive approach with clear vision and strategy is required. This should feed into the direction the policy takes in relation to which countries, organizations or groups that can be seen as potentially useful for building relationships with, and managing the process. The last but not the least, a critical though should be given to the arguments for the case of recognition- less emphasis on the victim-focused arguments and more attention on our collective success in the last 14 years, common social characteristics and our potential prospects as a nation. The latter unifies the people of Somaliland more than the former. Finally, visits to Hargeisa by foreign delegations, and Edna or Awil‘s frequent appearances in abroad should no longer be a valid benchmark for our international relations success. We must rethink and adopt our approach.

END

Dr Mohamed Abdillaahi Omar
University Lecturer, London , United Kingdom
E-mail: [email protected]